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Abstract—Safety Case has become an integral component for
safety-certification in various Cyber Physical System domains
including automotive, aviation, medical devices, and military. The
certification processes for these systems are stringent and require
robust safety assurance arguments and substantial evidence
backing. Despite the strict requirements, current practices still
rely on manual methods that are brittle, do not have a systematic
approach or thorough consideration of sound arguments. In addi-
tion, stringent certification requirements and ever-increasing sys-
tem complexity make ad-hoc, manual assurance case generation
(ACG) inefficient, time consuming, and expensive. To improve
the current state of practice, we introduce a structured ACG
tool which uses system design artifacts, accumulated evidence,
and developer expertise to construct a safety case and evaluate
it in an automated manner. We also illustrate the applicability
of the ACG tool on a remote-control car testbed case study.
Index Terms—Assurance Case, Safety Case, Goal Structuring
Notation, Automated Generation.
ABBREVIATIONS
AC Assurance Case
ACG Assurance Case Generation
AEBS Automatic Emergency Braking System
ALC Assurance-based Learning-enabled CPS
CPS Cyber Physical System
GSN Goal Structuring Notation
SC Safety Case
I. INTRODUCTION
Design of Assurance Case (AC) for safety critical CPSs
has become an important industrial requirement. An assurance
case [1], [2] is a structured argument which composes different
pieces of evidence to show that system-level goals have been
satisfied. The goals (or claims) refer to the property of the
system being monitored like safety, reliability, security, etc.,
and evidences are facts about a component of the system,
that are accumulated by prior research or experiments. An
argument links relevant evidences to the claims, and can either
be deterministic, probabilistic or qualitative. Safety Case (SC)
is a specialized assurance case widely used for assuring the
system level safety in CPS domains like aviation [3], military
[4] and automotive [5].
Despite its importance, construction of a safety case is often
done manually by developers without a systematic approach
or thorough consideration of safety arguments. Conventional
safety case reports are long textual arguments which typically
try to communicate and argue about the safety of a sys-
tem. However, unclear and poorly structured textual language
(mostly English) has always been a problem (explained in
[6]) in communicating safety arguments among the different
designers or operators involved. To overcome the irregularities
with conventional textual safety reports and to make the docu-
mentation of safety case easy to read, graphical structures such
as Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE) [7] or Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN) [6] was introduced.
The GSN is widely used among the two. It is a graphical
way of constructing a safety case using individual elements
of claims, sub-claims, assumptions, arguments and evidences.
The idea behind the goal structure is to show how the top-
level claim or goal can be decomposed into multiple sub-
goals connected with some argument structure. This process
is repeated to further decompose sub-goals until it reaches
the leaf-goals which can be directly supported by low-level
component evidences. This graphical structuring of arguments
has certainly simplified and improved the comprehension of
assurance arguments across all stakeholders, thus encouraging
its use in various safety-critical industries (listed in [6]). How-
ever, as explained in [8], GSN has only provided a simplified
means of expressing arguments but has not improved the
quality of the argument structure itself. Also, the design of
the GSN is still performed manually by human experts which
makes it time consuming and error prone.
There are several tools [9]–[12] that support development of
CAE or GSN for safety cases. These tools provide excellent vi-
sual aid and editors for rapid prototyping, and management of
large safety cases. However, they do not provide a mechanism
to automate the construction of the CAE or GSN. These tools
still require a human expert to manually generate the safety
arguments that connect the goals to the low-level evidences.
Also, as discussed in [13], these tools lack a formal basis,
which has limited their automation capability. Additionally,
most of these tools do not provide a mechanism to quantify
the confidence of the developed safety case, which is an
important functionality. These limitations motivate the need
for an automated tool that can develop and evaluate safety
case with little human involvement.
Our Contributions: In this work, we introduce an ACG tool
that uses design artifacts of the target system along with the
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Fig. 1: DeepNNCar is a resource-constrained autonomous RC car that uses
Camera, LIDAR, IR-Optocoupler, and Raspberry Pi.
evidences aggregated by human experts to generate an safety
case GSN starting from a given certification criteria (CC). Our
goal with the ACG tool is to provide a structured method
for the construction and evaluation of an assurance argument
in support of a given certification criteria while automating
the process to reduce human involvement. To realize these
goals, the tool uses a classic divide and conquer strategy
leveraging iterative search to decompose complex GSN goals
and to find evidences that match them. We follow a rapid
prototyping approach to realize the components of the ACG
tool. Specifically, our contributions are as follows:
• We elaborate the three-step methodology of the ACG tool
that automates the safety case generation process.
• We discuss three core steps of Link-Seal-Expand for itera-
tive goal decomposition and automated GSN construction.
• We discuss a method using confidence score to evaluate the
credibility of the generated safety case.
We evaluate the ACG tool for an illustrative example of an
AEBS for a RC car testbed called DeepNNCar [14]. We hy-
pothesize this automated safety assurance construction method
would reduce the cost of assuring CPS, provide a robust
process that minimizes human involvement, and accelerate the
entire process of safety case generation.
Outline: In Section II, we discuss a few background con-
cepts required to understand this work. Section III sets up an
example of AEBS, that is used throughout the paper to explain
the ACG concepts. Section IV describes the core components
of the ACG tool. In Section V, we illustrate the utility of ACG
tool in the context of the AEBS example. Section VI discusses
a safety case evaluation scheme using confidence score as a
metric. Section VII discusses the related work. In Section VIII,
we make a brief discussion about the capabilities of the ACG
tool, and thereafter we list a few possible future enhancements.
Finally, in Section IX we present our conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides an overview of safety case, GSN and
the ALC Toolchain that is going to be extensively referred
throughout this paper.
A. Safety Case (SC)
Safety Case has become an important requirement to prove
the functional safety of safety-critical CPS, and has become
a wide standard in the automotive, aerospace, and military
industries. Safety case is a structured argument made using
evidences to support the different claims made about the
properties of the system. For every component or subsystem,
a claim can be made about its safety, reliability, availability,
security, etc. Then either deterministic, probabilistic, or qual-
itative arguments can be used along with evidences to prove
if the claim about the system holds. The elements of a safety
case as explained in [1] are:
• Claim: The property of a system that requires assurance (e.g.
safety, reliability, availability, security, etc.)
• Evidence: Facts, sub-goals, assumptions, functions, and sub-
arguments which provide a conclusive support to prove the
claims made about the system.
• Arguments: A linking structure between the claim and the
supporting evidence. Used to show how the claims are
backed by the evidence available for the system.
• Inference/Operators: Provides rules or mechanisms to trans-
form the arguments.
Despite the importance of designing robust safety case for
safety-critical systems, there have been cases (explained in [6])
like the Clapham Rail Disaster [15] and the Piper Alpha off-
shore oil, and gas platform disaster [16] where substandard
safety documentation did not confer to any standards and
lacked any systematic approach by designers. These incidents
illustrate the hazards of not clearly understanding, communi-
cating and documenting a safety report. The main problem as
seen from these incidents is the use of text (e.g, English) in the
safety reports. The ambiguity of using text hinders designers or
operators at different levels to generate a robust safety report.
This problem of using text led to a requirement of a structured
notation to explain claims, arguments and evidences. This
requirement led to introduction of Claims-Argument-Evidence
(CAE) and Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).
B. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [6] was introduced by Tim
Kelly at the University of York. It is a graphical argument
notation which explicitly represents the elements of a safety
case (claims, sub-claims, requirements, context, assumptions
and evidence) as a node structure and maps the relationship
that exists between each of these nodes. The purpose of this
graphical goal structure is to show an iterative breakdown of
the goal to sub-goals, with a mention of the assumptions and
context under which the decomposition can be made. Also,
the iterative decomposition continues to a point when there is
no further decomposition, or we have sufficient evidence to
support the parent claim.
The GSN with its graphical representation clearly removes
the ambiguities involved in defining a safety case using textual
language, but this does not qualitatively imply anything about
the argument itself (as explained in [8]). The arguments,
sub-goals, and evidences constituting a safety case can be
imperfect, and the conventional GSN has no justification
(or rationale) to indicate if the sub-goals or the evidence is
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Fig. 2: (a) The operation of the DeepNNCar is split into sensing-state estimation-control tasks. F – represents the functionality of the components in the
system, HW – represents the hardware component which is responsible for the function, and SW – represents the software component which is responsible
for the function. The arrows between the tasks represents the interdependence of the different components and their functionality. (b) Function-component
mapping of DeepNNCar operations. Shows the different hardware and software components that contribute to a function.
sufficient to support the safety case. Uncertainty in the sub-
goal’s supporting evidence can lower the assurance of the
entire safety case.
To overcome the uncertainty problem in the conventional
GSN, Hawkins et al. [17] proposed a new structure of safety
arguments called the assured safety arguments which extends
the conventional safety argument by decomposing it into
two separate arguments: (1) safety argument – performs the
decomposition of the safety goal and presents a strategy to
explain the reason behind it, and (2) confidence argument –
holds the justification about the sufficiency of the confidence
in the safety argument being made. This extension of the con-
fidence arguments would provide a mechanism to backtrack
the branching decisions of the GSN, while making it robust.
We are currently working on extending our GSN to have a
rationale block which holds a justification about the evidence
used while selecting a (sub)goal.
C. ALC Toolchain
The ALC Toolchain [18] provides an integrated set of tools
for development of CPS with a particular focus on systems
using Learning Enabled Components (LECs). The toolchain
supports GSN safety case and allows individual nodes within
an safety case to contain links to other artifacts including sys-
tem architectural models, testing results and analysis, formal
verification results, etc. Within a GSN argument, these linked
artifacts can be interpreted as needed based on the desired task
such as justification of argument structure, supporting evidence
blocks, or system functional decomposition among others.
The ALC Toolchain is the future implementation platform
for the automated ACG method presented in this paper and
is referenced for implementation details in the remaining
sections.
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Fig. 4: The AEBS case study for DeepNNCar platoon, where the follower car
(C2) is required to maintain a minimum safe distance dmin from the leader
car.
III. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate our proposed ACG tool, we introduce a realis-
tic application of an Automatic Emergency Braking System
(AEBS) using an RC car testbed DeepNNCar. AEBS is a
feature that will automatically override any driver input and
apply maximum braking to immediately stop the car in the
case of an imminent collision. To motivate the AEBS safety
case, we consider the example of a car platoon as shown in
Fig. 4. Throughout this text, the front car will be referred to
as “Leader” and the second car is referred to as “Follower”.
These cars move around an indoor race track with varying
speed (Vt) and steering controls (St), and are equipped with
a several sensors including 2D LIDAR, IR Opto-coupler,
and decawave positioning [19]. The entire operation of the
sensing-perception-control operations of these cars are shown
in Fig. 2. At each time step t, the sensors of the cars capture
different observations Ot which includes the current position
pt = (xt, yt), current speed (Vt), current steering (St) and
the distance to the car in front of it (dt). These observations
are used by different software components in the perception
and state estimation block to generate information (it) which
includes lanes detected (Lt), object detected (Objt) and slip
status (slipt). These values are then passed to the different
controllers which calculate the required actuation commands
(at) including the steering and speed Pulse Width Modulation
(PWM) values.
Certification Criteria: To prove the AEBS reliably works,
we need to assure that the follower car always maintains a
minimum safe separation distance (dmin) from the leader car.
This follows from the reasoning that, for dt ≥ dmin, the AEBS
system has enough time to compute and apply the reverse
PWM required to slow or stop the car from its current speed.
Mathematically, the problem can be expressed as:
dmin ≥ dt ∧ (obj) (1)
So, if there is a car detected (obj=1) by the perception
subsystem, and if the distance measurement from the LIDAR
dt is always greater than the minimum safe threshold distance
dmin, then we can prove in the safety case that the cars
will always avoid collision under a set of assumptions. From
Eq. (1) above, we see the safety case requires conjunctive
claim proof that the object (car) is detected and the distance
from the LIDAR dt is always greater than dmin.
Further, the first step of decomposing the certification
criteria for AEBS is performed based on the state (stopped,
moving) of the cars (we assume that we know the states and
position of both the cars). For the two car platoon, there are
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four possible operating modes: mode1 - Leader stationary &
Follower moving, mode2 - Leader moving & Follower moving,
mode3 - Leader moving & Follower stationary, and mode4 -
Leader stationary & Follower stationary. For the AEBS case
study, we are particularly interested in modes 1 and 2 where
the follower car is moving. A similar iterative decomposition
is performed using the proposed ACG tool till the lowest level
leaf node with conclusive evidence is reached. (illustrated in
Section V)
IV. THE ACG TOOL
The Assurance case generation tool (Fig. 3) is responsi-
ble for automatically generating the safety case for a given
certification criteria, and evaluating that safety case with a
confidence score (discussed in Section VI). The generated
safety case will be expressed as a GSN. Fig. 5 illustrates the
three phases involved in the ACG process, they are:
1) Pre-processing involves accumulating system design arti-
facts and curating an evidence store about the components
of the target system.
2) Structuring Claim involves construction of a structured
claim from the given certification criteria.
3) Iterative Goal Decomposition involves applying decompo-
sition operators (Link-Seal-Expand) to decompose the GSN
until the leaf nodes are reached.
The steps involved in each phase is elaborated in greater detail
in the subsections below.
A. Design Artifacts
The proposed ACG tool will systematically leverage the
system design information to automate the decomposition
of the certification criteria to smaller sub-claims that can
eventually be mapped and sealed using appropriate evidences.
One way of using the entire system information is by breaking
them into different graphical representations. These graphs can
then be used to find supporting evidences and find relational
operators among sub-claims during the safety construction
process. Some of the graphs that can be used are (illustra-
tive graphs for the DeepNNCar AEBS example is listed if
available):
• System Functional Breakdown (SFD) is a logical breakdown
of the system functionality that is involved or responsible
for a specific mission. (Fig. 2-b)
• System Physical Decomposition is a logical breakdown of
the system into sub-systems, functions and components.
(Fig. 2-a)
• Interconnectivity Graph is a graph with interconnectivity
among the different hardware and software components.
(Fig. 2-a)
• Behavioral Graph captures the activities associated with a
system/component.
• Mapping Diagrams are graphs which indicate the mapping
of functions to components, software blocks to hardware
blocks, or activities to hardware or software, etc. (Fig. 2-a)
• Ontology Graph uses a common, domain-specific set of
terms and relationships to support mapping of concepts
across the other graph-of-graph elements.
• System Architectural Model captures all components in the
system and the interconnections between them. An archi-
tectural model constructed in the ALC Toolchain for the
DeepNNCar is shown as a ”Design Artifact” in Fig. 3.
B. Curated Evidence Store
The Evidence Store is a table consisting of information
about the various components and functions, evidence arti-
facts supporting their correct operation, and all assumptions
required for components to work correctly. Evidence artifacts
can take any form (eg. statistical analysis of test data, an-
alytical analysis, etc.), but must provide enough proof that
the corresponding component works reliably under the stated
assumptions. It is up to the developer to determine when the
available evidence is sufficient for use in the safety case.
Curated evidence for the different components of DeepN-
NCar’s operation is shown in Table I. The supporting evi-
dences for the components were gathered based on a number
of randomized hardware and software tests (shown in Fig. 2)
under different operating environments to evaluate when the
components/tests succeed and fail. For e.g. (1) the camera
module was tested under different lighting conditions and was
found to work best in environments with evenly distributed
lighting conditions with (800-1000) lumens of light, and (2)
the LIDAR module was tested under different indoor and
outdoor operating environment with different obstacles and
was found to reliably and accurately work in smaller indoor
rooms (due its operating range of 12 m). Similar information
about different components of DeepNNCar was accumulated
as evidences.
Once we have accumulated evidence for all the systems
components and compiled the design artifacts required to
understand the alternatives and dependencies in the system,
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we can start the safety case generation process (illustrated
in Fig. 5) that includes (1) structuring claims for the given
certification criteria, and (2) iterative goal decomposition.
C. Structuring Claims for GSN Root Node
The first step of generating the safety case is to design
a structured claim for the root node of the GSN from the
certification criteria. After this step we expect the certifica-
tion criteria given in natural language to be expressed as
a structured claim statement referring to elements in the
design artifacts. In the case study of AEBS, the structured
claim for the certification criteria (maintain safe distance and
avoid collision) is expressed in Eq. (1). This mapping of the
certification criteria to the claim was manually performed by
a human expert based on the states of the cars (explained in
Section III), where the AEBS is important. Once we have a
claim for the root node of the GSN, we can start an iterative
decomposition process using some basic operators (Link-Seal-
Expand), and logical connectives.
D. Core Steps for Decomposing GSN Goal
After obtaining a structured claim for the root node of the
GSN, it must be further decomposed into sub-goals (and sub-
claims) until a leaf node is reached. In this work, we define
leaf nodes to be component-level nodes which have direct
supporting evidence found in the curated evidence store. The
decomposition in the ACG tool is handled by three primary
operations Link, Seal and Expand, along with basic logical
connectives.
1) Link: To avoid reuse of evidence for similar GSN
branches, we use the link operation to link evidence nodes
that have been previously used in different branches of the
GSN. Effectively, if the link has seen a relationship proved
previously among the different sub-goals, then this information
can be used in the future to stop the exploration for evidence.
This feature of the link is helpful in reducing the required
number of iterations (explained for the DeepNNCar example
in Section V).
For this, we use Link as a background step which involves
creating an evidence repository with modular evidences for
various claims which can be reused in different GSN branches
or safety cases. As discussed above, the construction and man-
agement of the curated evidence store itself can be partially
automated. However, manual input from the developer is still
required to link each source of evidence to the relevant system
components and safety claims.
2) Seal: The seal operation queries the curated evidence
store to look for supporting evidences of a (sub)goal, and
then decides if the available evidence is sufficient to stop the
iteration or further evidence is required. Evidence is said to
be sufficient if the claim in the (sub)goal cannot be further
decomposed and there is evidence available to directly support
the claim. Some sub(goals) may have evidence to support the
claim, and in such cases the iteration looking for supporting
evidences can be stopped. However, in cases involving higher
level goals, the available evidence may not be sufficient to
directly support a claim. In this case, it is necessary to
query the evidence store repeatedly until sufficient evidence is
available. For goals with supporting evidence from the store,
an evidence with maximum confidence (explained in Section
VI) that satisfies the goal under the mutual satisfaction of the
assumptions is selected. Sometimes it is also possible that a
sub-goal may not have sufficient evidence, in such cases we
claim the node to be orphaned. Whenever an orphaned node
is found, we can stop the search and prove the safety claim
cannot be argued until new evidence to support the node is
available.
If the Seal operation has found a linking evidence (from the
evidence store or Link operation), then it seals of the sub-goal
without allowing for further exploration. A component may
have multiple supporting evidences based on the operating
conditions and its functionality. In such cases the seal node
will have to select one evidence artifact from the available
options, and this selection process is discussed in Section VI.
3) Expand: When no evidence for directly supporting a
goal is found during the Seal phase, the goal must be decom-
posed into multiple sub-goals with corresponding assumption,
context, and strategy nodes. The expand operation drives this
decomposition of goals into sub-goals using the available
design artifacts. Each goal in the generated safety case corre-
sponds to a system function which may require inputs from
other components in order to operate correctly. The system
architectural model in Fig. 2 shows these dependencies be-
tween components, and is one design artifact used to drive goal
decomposition. The strategy which connects the sub-goals can
be formalized using different logical combination functions.
This step refines the argument strategy of the decomposed
goal node to find an appropriate logic gating function.
Logical Connectives (gating functions): The decomposi-
tion of the GSN results in the goal node being split into sub-
goals that can be connected using different gating functions
including AND and OR. For the AEBS example, the claim
resolution step results in two scenarios Mode 1 & 2, which
can be connected by an OR operator as shown in Fig. 7. This
decomposition is performed based on the states of the cars
(explained in Section III). A similar illustration of using the
gating function to combine the sub-goals is shown in Fig. 7
(explained in Section V).
E. Implementation and Automation
The ALC Toolchain introduced in Section II-C will be
used to implement the ACG including tool automation where
appropriate. The following paragraphs explain how each step
in the ACG workflow, shown in Fig. 5, will be automated.
The Pre-Processing step consists of accumulating the avail-
able design artifacts and constructing an evidence store.
For systems designed using the ALC Toolchain, all design
artifacts are automatically cataloged in a version-controlled
database and may be cross-referenced from other models as
needed, effectively eliminating the need for a developer to
collect artifacts manually. Systems designed outside of the
toolchain may upload design artifacts to be added to the
6
Claim Evidence
Type
Function Components/
Subsystems
Assumptions
Camera Module captures image of Leader
car in range (0.1, 1)m. (G1)
H/W &
S/W
Testing
Sensing Camera 1) Light intensity above 100 lumens
2) Leader car is within range (0.1,1)m
3) Is powered.
LIDAR Module provides distance of the
obstacles in range (0,12)m and (0°,359°).
(G2)
H/W &
S/W
Testing
Sensing LIDAR 1) Leader car is within scan range.
2) LIDAR scan motor is working.
3) Is powered.
IR Opto-coupler Module provides RPM in-
formation in range (16,160). (G3)
H/W &
S/W
Testing
Sensing IR-
Optocoupler
1) It is mounted on the chassis.
2) It can be occluded by plastic piece on wheel.
3) Is powered.
Lane Detection Module detects lanes and
orientation of track segment. (G4)
S/W
Testing
Detection Lane
Detection
1) Received frame from camera.
2) LD algorithm parameters are correct.
3) No light glare on track.
Obstacle Detection Module detects images
of car in range (0.1, 1)m. (G5)
SW
Testing
Detection Object
Detection
1) Received frame the camera.
2) Mobilenet V2 model weights are correct.
Current Speed Module information is in
range (0, 1)m/s. (G6)
S/W
Testing
State
Estimation
current
Speed
RPM-Speed conversion is correct.
Current Position Module updates cars posi-
tion on track. (G7)
S/W
Testing
State
Estimation
current
Position
Working on indoor track with lanes
Obstacle Distance Module provides dis-
tance of the obstacles in range (0,12)m
(150°,180°). (G8)
S/W
Testing
State
Estimation
Obstacle
Distance
Obstacle is within the scanning range (0, 12)m.
Slip Status Module identifies wheel slip.
(G9)
S/W
Testing
State
Estimation
Slip Status 1) Track surface is known.
2) Opto-coupler module is working correctly.
Steer LEC Module provides steer in range
(-30°, 30°). (G10)
S/W
Testing
Driving LEC Steer 1) Receives frames from camera.
2) Trained deep-learning model weights are correct.
3) Trained model has seen the track before.
OpenCV Steer Module steer in range (-30°,
30°). (G11)
S/W
Testing
Driving OpenCV
Steer
1) Receives frame from camera.
2) No light glares on track.
3) Lane-steer conversion is correct.
Braking Manager Module provides reverse
polarity RPWM to brake the car.(G12)
S/W
Testing
Braking Braking
Manager
Track surface allows braking.
Driving Manager Module provides Steer
PWM in range (10,20) & speed PWM in
range (15.58, 15.62). (G13)
S/W
Testing
Driving Driving
Manager
Receives updated sensor and processed data (not stale
ones).
PWM applicator Module applies PWM at
100Hz. (G14)
H/W &
S/W
Testing
Driving PWM
Applicator
1) Wiring to motors and GPIO done correctly.
2) Raspberry Pi is powered.
TABLE I: The sub-goals of the different functions is shown along with its requirement, evidence type and the assumptions under which they hold.
catalog. Construction of the curated evidence store itself can be
partially automated with use of this catalog. All artifacts in the
catalog which represent sources of evidence for the safety case
(eg., results from system testing, formal verification, or any
user-defined analysis methods) can be used to automatically
populate the available evidence in the evidence store. However,
the developer must manually link each piece of evidence to the
corresponding component in the system architectural model,
determine when the available evidence is sufficient to support
a claim, and define any assumptions required for the evidence
to be valid.
Next, the root node of the safety case must be derived
from the certification criteria during the Structuring Claim
step. This step requires translating a claim about the system
specified in natural language into a formal assurance claim.
While there is a significant body of research on automation for
such tasks, this is outside the scope of the ACG tool presented
in this paper. Instead, this step is not automated and must be
completed manually by the developer.
The Iterative Goal Decomposition step interprets the avail-
able artifacts to drive the Link, Seal, and Expand operations.
The Link step can be fully automated as a background task
which is executed after each iteration of the Seal and Expand
operations. When a branch of the safety case has been fully
decomposed into sealed leaf nodes, this completed section can
be added to the evidence store as a GSN fragment. This way,
if the fragment appears again in another branch of the safety
case, it can be immediately retrieved from the evidence store
instead of repeating the iterative decomposition process. The
Seal operation may be automated as a straight-forward query
of both the evidence store and any GSN fragments found
by the link operation. The Expand operation may also be
automated with an appropriate model interpreter. Since each
goal is linked to a component in the system architecture model,
a graph-traversal algorithm can determine all components
required for a goal to function correctly. This information,
combined with the assumptions listed in the evidence store, is
sufficient to decompose each goal into progressively smaller
sub-goals. Finally, the iterative decomposition process using
the Seal and Expand operations can be automated with an
appropriate workflow.
Once a complete safety case has been constructed, auto-
mated evaluation and correctness checks can be implemented
with an appropriate formal specification language (eg. FOR-
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(G)
Follower car
does not
collide with
the leader car.
(A)
1) Indoor track with suitable Lighting condition for
perception.
2) Track surface allows for acceleration/ braking.
3) Leader car is within sensor measurement 
range. 
(S1)
Arguing the safety requirement by 
showing the LIDAR, Object Detection
and Braking Manager components
meet the safety requirements
(G8)
Obstacle
Detection
Module detects
images of car in
range (0.1, 1)m
(G12)
Braking Manager
Module provides
reverse polarity
RPWM > VPWM
(A8)
1) Received frame from camera 
 2) Mobilenet V2 model weights
are correct.
(G5)
Obstacle Distance
Module provides
distance of the
obstacles in range
(0,12)m
(A5)
Obstacle is within the
distance measurement
range.
Sub-goals
Assumptions
Argument
(Strategy)
Evidence (SG1)
Leader car stationary
Follower car moving
(SG2)
Leader car moving
Follower car moving
          (S)         
          Decompose the Safety claim based on 
the operating states (moving, stationary)
of the cars. Two cases of particular 
Interest will be considered
Sealed
Sub-goal
(A12)
Brakes of the car works
for the track.
(S2)
Arguing the safety requirement by 
showing the LIDAR, Object Detection
and Braking Manager components
meet the safety requirements
(G8)
Obstacle
Detection
Module detects
images of car in
range (0.1, 1)m
(G12)
Braking Manager
Module provides
reverse polarity
RPWM > VPWM
(A8)
1) Received frame from camera 
 2) Mobilenet V2 model weights
are correct.
(G5)
Obstacle Distance
Module provides
distance of the
obstacles in
range (0,12)m
(A5)
Obstacle is within the
distance measurement
range.
(A12)
Brakes of the car works
for the track.
(G2)
LIDAR Module
provides distance of
the obstacle in range
(0,12)m and (0,359)
degrees.
(G2)
LIDAR Module
provides distance of
the obstacle in range
(0,12)m and (0,359)
degrees.
(G1)
Camera Module
captures images of
objects in range
(0.1,1)m.
(G1)
Camera Module
captures images
of objects in range
(0.1,1)m.
(A2)
1) Leader car is within scan
range.
2) LIDAR is powered.
(A2)
1) Leader car is within
scan range.
2) LIDAR is powered.
(A1)
1) Lighting condition is above
acceptable 100 lumens.
2) Leader car is within capture range.
3) Camera is powered.
(A1)
1) Lighting condition is above
acceptable 100 lumens.
2) Leader car is within capture
range.
3) Camera is powered.
E2
E1
E2
E1
(S3)
        Argue the braking manager
computes accurate braking 
information if it 
gets reliable information from 
slip-status, LIDAR and 
current speed module.
(G3)
IR Opto-coupler
Module
provides reliable
RPM in range
(16,160)
(G9)
Slip Status
Module
identifies
wheel
sleep.
(A3)
1) IR-Opto-coupler is
mounted correctly. 
 2) It is powered.
(G5)
Obstacle Distance
Module provides
distance of the
obstacles in range
(0,12)m
(A5)
Obstacle is within the
distance measurement
range. (A9)
Slip can be identified
from current speed
values.
(S4)
        Argue the braking manager computes 
accurate braking information if it 
gets reliable information from 
slip-status, LIDAR and 
current speed module.
(G3)
IR Opto-coupler
Module
provides reliable
RPM in range
(16,160)
(G9)
Slip Status
Module
identifies
wheel sleep.
(A3)
1) IR-Opto-coupler is
mounted correctly. 
 2) It is powered.
(G5)
Obstacle
Distance Module
provides
distance of the
obstacles in
range (0,12)m
(A5)
Obstacle is within the
distance measurement
range.
(A9)
Slip can be identified
from current speed
values.
(G7)
Current Position
Module
accurately
updates the car
position on the
track.
(A7)
1) Camera has captured
the image. 
 2) LD-Position parameters
are correct.
Iteration 1
Iteration 2
Iteration 3
Fig. 6: A GSN fragment of the DeepNNCar’s AEBS case study.
MULA [20]).
V. ACG FOR THE AEBS CASE STUDY
In this section we manually design a GSN for the AEBS
example to outline the complexity of graphing and to illustrate
the manual dependence in the design process. We then apply
the ACG tool for the same example and iterate through the
building blocks to generate an automated GSN.
A. Manual GSN tree generation
A GSN fragment for the DeepNNCar’s AEBS example is
shown in Fig. 6. We manually designed the GSN using the
evidence store (Table I) and the design artifacts (Fig. 2-a and
Fig. 2-b). To prove AEBS reliably works, we need to assure
the claim has sufficient evidences in both Mode 1 & 2. So, we
perform a parallel decomposition of the two modes in Fig. 6.
The conventional GSN uses different shapes for representing
the blocks. In this hierarchical decomposition, the top goal is
referred to as the parent node, and the decomposed sub-goals
are referred to as child nodes. The principal symbols used in
the GSN construction are:
• Blue blocks represent the goals/sub-goals, e.g. follower car
does not collide with the leader car. Each blue goal is
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decomposed until there is direct supporting evidence from
the evidence store.
• Gray blocks represent the various assumptions made under
which the goals are satisfied. For the AEBS example,
the top goal is satisfied under assumptions including that
the track surface allows for permissible operation of the
car, the lighting is sufficient for the sensors to work, etc.
The assumptions of the parent goal is a superset of the
assumptions made by the child nodes.
• Green blocks represent the strategy that will be used to prove
that the goal holds.
• Orange blocks represent the evidences used to seal a goal.
These evidences can be results of various randomized hard-
ware or software tests.
• Purple blocks represent the sealed goals. i.e. goals which
have been directly supported by evidence and further ex-
ploration is not possible or necessary.
In Fig. 6, the different decomposition levels are separated
using dotted lines, and they are termed as iterations. We can
also see a few sub-goals are sealed with evidences (represented
by purple blocks), while some still require further exploration
(vertical dotted line extensions from the sub-goals in Iteration
3).
Designing this GSN for a complex system like DeepNNCar
is time consuming and required us to iterate through the
different goals and sub-goals. To avoid the hassle of manually
graphing the large GSN structure that was spread across
multiple pages, we applied the ACG tool introduced in Section
IV to generate the GSN for the same AEBS example.
B. GSN generation using ACG tool
The safety case generation for the DeepNNCar’s AEBS
example using ACG tool is shown in Fig. 7. For each of the
modes identified earlier we generate a safety case iterating
through Link-Seal-Expand steps discussed in Section IV. The
design artifacts (Fig. 2-a and Fig. 2-b) are used along with the
evidence store (Table I) to generate the GSN.
Iteration 1: As the first iteration for the GSN generation, the
evidence store is curated by the ALC Toolchain using design
artifacts and tests on the components of the system. Once,
the evidence store is designed, the claim for the root node
of GSN is structured for the AEBS certification criteria by a
human expert. Then based on the states of the car, the claim
is parallelly decomposed into Mode 1 & 2 as shown in Fig. 7.
Iteration 2: Seal– ACG tool looks for supporting evidence
for the goal (AEBS) from the evidence store. Since no support-
ing evidence can be found in the evidence store, the Expand
operation is performed to decompose the goal. The AEBS
node makes use of the functional complimentary pattern which
shows that maintaining safe distance, including stopping when
obstacle distance is less than dmin, requires the conjunction
of three functions: obstacle detection, measuring obstacle dis-
tance, and the breaking manager providing appropriate PWM
signal. This results in the three sub-goals {G8, G5, G12}
logically connected using the AND operator with the parent
AEBS goal. Since there is no concluding evidence from the
G
Mode1
(SG1)
Mode2
(SG2)
G8 G5 G12
G2 G1
E2 E1
G8 G9 G6
G2 G6
E2
G3
E3
G3
E3
G8 G5 G12
G2 G1
E2 E1
G8 G9 G6
G2 G6
E2
G3
E3
G3
E3
G7
G4
G1
E1
Iteration 1
Iteration 2
Iteration 3
Iteration 4
Iteration 5 Linked
Evidence
Fig. 7: The graph which is generated by continuously iterating through the
Link-Seal-Expand steps of the ACG tool.
current leaf nodes {G8, G5, G12}, the ACG tool iterates this
step again to decompose these sub-goals further.
Iteration 3: Seal– ACG tool looks for supporting evidences
for the sub-goals {G8, G5, G12} from the evidence store,
since no supporting evidence can be found in the evidence
store, the Expand operation is performed to decompose the
goals. Looking at the evidence table, and functional breakdown
graph (Fig. 2-b) the ACG tool performs the following goal
decomposition’s: (1) obstacle distance node (G8) depends on
the LIDAR node (G2), (2) the obstacle detection node (G5)
depends on the camera node (G1), and (3) the braking manager
node (G12) depends on the slip status (G9), IR-Optocoupler
(G3), Object distance (G8) and current position (G7) nodes
(Only for the case when the two cars are moving). The sub-
goals of the braking manager are logically connected using
the AND operator. Again, since no evidence was found for
the three sub-goals, ACG tool iterates further.
Iteration 4: Seal– Again, the ACG tool looks for evidences
of sub-goals {G2,G1,G8,G9,G6,G7} from the evidence store
to seal off the branches. The tool finds, conclusive evidences
for G1 and G2 and seals them. In this work we advocate
the selection of an evidence with maximum confidence score.
However, most of the component sub-goals of this example
has only one piece of supporting evidence for selection. So,
we directly select the only available evidence to seal the nodes.
All the other sub-goals of G6, G7, G8 and G9 do not have
supporting evidence and must be further expanded. Expand–
the obstacle distance node (G8) depends on the evidence from
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	Confidence	Score
	H/W	component
Factors
S/W	component
Factors	
Scan	Frequency Measurement	Range
External	Factors
S/W	Development	
Experience
H/W	Development
Experience
S/W		Tools Programming
Language
0.6 0.3 0.1
0.25 0.75 0.2 0.8 0.5
0.5
[a1,a2,...an] [a1,a2,...an] [a1,a2,...an] [a1,a2,...an] [a1,a2,...an] [a1,a2,...an]
Fig. 8: The evidence evaluation tree for the LIDAR module of DeepNNCar.
LIDAR node (G2), the slip status node (G9) depends on
evidence from current speed node (G6), and (G6) depends on
evidence from the IR-Optocoupler node (G3), and the current
position node (G7) depends on evidence from Lane detection
node (G4) (only for Mode2, as in this case both the cars are
moving and the braking manager requires constant information
updates of the position of the cars, which is not that important
in Mode1 as the leader car is stationary). Since, none of these
are nodes are sealed, a further iteration is performed by the
tool.
Iteration 5: Seal– The ACG tool again looks for evidences
of sub-goals {G6, G3, G4(for mode 2)} from the evidence
store and finds that node G3 has supporting evidence. Also,
the current speed node (G6) has dependence on G3, for which
evidence has already been found the evidence store. So, using
the evidence of G3 as linking evidence, the tool seals both
sub-goal nodes. However, G4 has no supporting evidence and
hence is further expanded. Expand: Lane detection node (G4)
is further decomposed to a single node G1, and a further
iteration is performed to find an evidence for it.
Iteration 6: Seal– the ACG tool looks for the evidence of
the camera node (G1) to seal it off. Since it is a component
node, direct evidence is available from the evidence store.
Since every branch of the GSN is sealed off with evidence,
iteration is finished, and the AC is complete.
VI. SAFETY CASE EVALUATION
Safety case evaluation is important for quantifying the
confidence of the generated safety case [21]. For evaluating
the credibility of the generated safety case, we compute a
confidence score to the top goal node associated with the
certification criteria. Our mechanism to identify this score is
based on a bottom up approach, which moves the confidence
associated with the evidence used to seal a claim. The safety
evaluation in the ACG tool is now performed manually by
a human expert at design time, but we are working on
automating it.
A. Confidence Score Estimation
Based on the operating context and the expert’s assessments
regarding the component module, every evidence node in the
Attribute Assessment Score
Scan Frequency precise at 2Hz
Precise at 4 Hz
0.4
0.6
Measurement Range precise in range 0-3 m
precise in range 3-6 m
precision in range 6-12 m
0.8
0.6
0.5
Software Tools – –
Programming
Language
Python
C++
0.5
0.8
Software
Development
Experience
Programming Knowledge
Communication protocols
Knowledge
0.4
0.7
Hardware
Development
Experience
PWM Knowledge
Motor Knowledge
UART Knowledge
0.8
0.6
0.7
TABLE II: The assessment score Table for attributes of the LIDAR component
of DeepNNCar.
GSN structure gets a confidence score, and the ones with the
higher score will be chosen as the supporting evidence. The
confidence score can be computed using an approach described
in [8] which performs confidence evaluation using Evidential
Reasoning (ER) [22]. ER is a concept of assimilating multiple
attributes of a piece of evidence into a single coherent assess-
ment. Specifically, the evidences of a claim are decomposed
into various different attributes {e1, e2, ......en} which are
then further decomposed to sub-attributes and this process is
repeated till further breakdown is not possible. We refer to this
structure as the evidence evaluation tree, and we have designed
one such structure for the LIDAR module of DeepNNCar (see
Fig. 8). The attributes and sub-attributes of the evidence tree
vary according to the class of evidence (software module,
hardware module) and the context of operation.
At the lowest level of the attribute decomposition, the
designer can provide a score for the different assessment
{a1, a2, ......an} regarding the attribute. These assessments
vary for different class of evidences (software, hardware) and
the context of their operation. A sample attribute assessment
for the LIDAR module is shown in Table II. Every attribute
can have an assessment and a score, which is statistically
computed by a human expert based on his experience of how
the components work under different scenarios. In Table II
we have a few assessment scores for different attributes of a
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LIDAR module, and from various tests of the component we
assigned the score. We found the LIDAR to most precisely
measure distances of objects in range 0-3 meters, so a score of
0.8 is assigned, and similarly the LIDAR’s precision degrades
when the object is in the range 6-12 meters, and so a score of
0.5 is assigned. A similar assessment score was evaluated for
each of the other attributes. These assessment scores are also
referred to as belief functions.
Once, we have the belief function for all the leaf level sub-
attributes, and if the importance (weights) of the attributes is
available towards the claim, then the ER algorithm [22] can be
used to assimilate them. The algorithm is developed based on
multi-attribute evaluation framework and evidence combina-
tion rule of Dempster—Shafer (D–S) theory of evidence [23].
The three steps involved in the algorithm (as explained in [24])
are: (1) weighting the belief distribution – weights are assigned
to the belief distribution based on the importance of attribute
towards the top goal safety claim, (2) aggregation process –
combine all the assessment of the basic/ sub-attributes, and (3)
generation of combined belief degree – after aggregating the
assessments for all the basic attributes, the combined belief
degree is computed for the entire evidence.
The weights of the attributes are important in computing the
confidence score, and they can be estimated either randomly by
the designer based on each attribute’s importance towards the
goal, or can be computed using elaborate methods of pairwise
comparison of attributes [25] (In this work the weights are
chosen by the expert based on his intuition of the component).
Then the beliefs are propagated from the leaf nodes, combined
along with the weights, and summed with the scores of the
other sibling sub-attributes to compute an assessment score.
This assessment score represents the overall confidence of
the evidence. A similar evaluation of the evidence can be
performed for all the nodes in the GSN structure.
Once a confidence score is available on all the sealed
evidence nodes, we use compound semantics based upon the
logical operators used in the strategy combining the sub-
claims. Some similar composition using logical operators has
been applied in literature [26], [27] for reliability estimation
in CPS. The composition works as follows:
• AND operator will propagate the minimum confidence
score.
• OR operator will propagate the maximum confidence score
from all the available branches.
The safety case evaluation scheme will assign a confidence
score to the top goal node associated with the certification
criteria.
B. Evidence Coverage
We are also currently working on integrating the metric of
evidence coverage as one of the attributes used in evidential
reasoning. From the GSN structure we can infer that the claims
supported by the evidence should always be a superset of the
claims made in the goal node. Also, the assumptions made
by the evidence should be a subset of the assumptions made
in the context of the goal node which we are trying to seal
with the evidence. We use this containment relationship among
the GSN blocks at different hierarchical levels to evaluate the
quality of the supporting evidence. We term this method of
evaluating the evidence based on their containment relation
to the higher-level goal as “Evidence Coverage”. We use this
based on our hypothesis that higher score should be given
to the evidence that provides the biggest margin between
the assumptions. Also, this metric is qualitative unlike the
confidence score which is quantitative.
VII. RELATED WORK
As explained in [28], current safety case construction prac-
tices can be divided into one of three categories: Prescriptive
where standards explicitly define the required development
processes and procedures, Goal-Oriented where high-level
safety goals are specified but the process for achieving them
is flexible and left to the system developer, or Blended which
uses aspects from both of the other categories. Rinehart et al.
examine the processes used in various industries and show that
prescriptive techniques tend to be used in industries with well
understood technologies and a history of safe operation. How-
ever, they note there is a general trend toward goal-oriented
approaches, similar to the ACG tool proposed in this paper,
such as the Risk-Informed Safety Case [29] from NASA. Goal-
oriented approaches appear to be a suitable option for CPSs
which operate in highly uncertain environments.
There are several commonly encountered pitfalls in the
construction of safety cases. Leveson [30] identifies a variety
of these pitfalls and provides suggestions for avoiding them.
For one, safety case construction and system safety analysis
should be an ongoing process started early in the design cycle
as opposed to a discrete activity performed near the end of
system development for the purpose of certification. Leveson
also shows that safety cases are prone to confirmation bias
and argues that developers should instead attempt to show
when a system can become unsafe. ”The Nimrod Review” [31]
provides examples of both of these fallacies where the Nimrod
aircraft was inherently assumed to be safe due to a history of
safe operation, and the resulting safety case did not provide
any real improvement in the safe operation of the aircraft.
While some of the lessons learned from these examples require
human input and understanding to address, other issues can
be mitigated with the use of appropriate assurance case tools.
These include enforcing the use of sound safety case patterns,
promoting early and continuous development by reducing the
time required for construction, and tightly integrating system
assurance with the relevant system models and documentation
among others.
For simplifying the ACG process several commercial and
research tools are developed. Maksimov, Mike, et al. [32]
provide a comprehensive survey on the assurance and safety
case tools developed in the last two decades. This paper reports
46 assurance case tools and evaluates them based on their
capability to generate, maintain, assess and report safety cases.
For comparison we have listed a few commercial and research
tools. Commercial tools mainly focus on providing a platform
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for developing and managing assurance cases. Assurance Case
Construction and Evaluation Support System (ACCESS) [9]
is a tool based on Microsoft visio that aids in creation and
maintenance of safety cases. It provides a platform for rapid
prototyping, node creation, node coloring, of the GSN argu-
ment structure it creates. CertWare workbench [12] is another
tool based on Eclipse that provides various functionalities
like multi-user safety case editing, change tracking, standard
safety case templates, and cheat sheets for simple and fast
safety case development. Similarly, Assurance and safety case
environment (ASCE) [10] provides an environment for simple
safety case creation and management, and allows for simple
and low cost generation of safety case reports. Also, D-
Case editor from DEOS [11] is an open-source platform
implemented as an eclipse plugin to generate and manage GSN
argument structures.
In addition to these, several research tools have made
significant improvements in automating the safety case gen-
eration process. Gacek et al. [33] introduce Resolute, a tool
which generates safety cases from system architecture mod-
els specified in AADL [34] along with formal claims and
rules specified in an appropriate domain-specific modeling
language. Resolute can also automatically propagate updates
from the architectural model to the safety case and check for
any assumption violations, but manual effort is still required
to construct the formal claims and rules. Similarly, Calinescu
et al. [35] apply ACG techniques to self-adaptive systems with
the ENTRUST methodology. This approach generates dynamic
assurance cases which adapt along with the system to remain
valid after system reconfiguration. Additionally, Denney et al.
[13], examine several such tools and provide an introduction
to their AdvoCATE toolset. AdvoCATE introduces a method-
ology for automated generation of safety cases and provides
functionality for argument analysis and improvement, evidence
selection, and claim definition and composition.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we first discuss the functionalities of the
ACG tool, which was motivated because of the limitations in
the existing ACG process and tools. We then discuss the future
enhancements to the automation of our ACG tool.
A. Reflections
As discussed before, large efforts are being made in de-
signing safety case reports for safety-critical systems which
has recently become a mandate in many industries. Despite
significant efforts and improvements, developing these reports
are typically a manual process requiring human involvement
at several steps. This has made the ACG process slow and
error prone. Overall, we feel less attention is being paid to the
methods by which these safety case reports are being devel-
oped. This was the primary motivation behind the proposal of
the ACG tool which significantly reduces the cost of assuring
CPSs, provides a robust process which minimizes human
involvement, and accelerates the entire process of safety case
generation. Specifically, the functionalities of the ACG tool
that were motivated by the limitations in the existing ACG
process and tools are:
• Automated artifact management (Section IV-E) and partially
automated evidence store generation from the system archi-
tecture models using the ALC Toolchain (Section II-C).
• Automated safety case GSN construction (Section V-B)
using domain artifacts and the curated evidence store.
• Linked atomic evidence nodes (Section IV-D1) to minimize
redundancy and promote reusablability for other safety
cases.
• Safety case evaluation (Section VI) to determine credibility
of the generated safety case using a confidence score.
Through we have not comprehensively discussed the spe-
cific research methods (e.g., FORMULA) that have been used
in the proposed tool, we believe enough description of the
research methods to achieve automation is discussed in Sec-
tion IV. To the best of our knowledge, several functionalities
(e.g. safety case evaluation) provided by our ACG tool are
either not provided or primitive in most of the tools discussed
in Section VII.
B. Future Work
As future steps, we plan to improve the existing components
and enhance the automation capability of the ACG tool. Some
possible extensions and improvements are listed below:
• Automating Claim Structuring: Currently, the conversion of
the informal certification criteria into the GSN root node
goal is performed by a human expert, however, as an
extension we would like to use a natural language processing
technique such as keyword matching [36] to automatically
extract and map the informal certification requirements to
goal of the GSN root node.
• Safety Case Evaluation: Currently, confidence score is used
to evaluate the generated safety case. However, confidence
as a metric is probably not sufficient to evaluate the cred-
ibility of the generated safety case. To strengthen this, we
may also need to evaluate the ACG in terms of soundness
and stability.
• Automating Seal operation: As discussed in Section IV-E,
the steps of linking each piece of evidence to the cor-
responding component in the system architectural model,
determining when the available evidence is sufficient to
support a claim, and defining any assumptions required
for the evidence to be valid are all done manually by the
developer. We want to automate this process.
• Extending GSN notation: The existing automated GSN
notation does not have a means to explain the justification
that indicates whether the sub-goals or evidence are suffi-
cient. This is a vital piece of argument justifying the GSN
branching and supporting evidence. We are working to add
a justification node to the existing GSN.
• Extending Logical connectives: Currently, the tool only
supports the AND and OR logical connectives. We are
working on extending to other logical connectives like XOR.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Safety Case has become a part of the regulatory certification
process in different CPS domains. Despite its importance,
very little efforts are being made to improve the existing
ACG process which is mostly been manual, ad-hoc without
a systematic approach. There are tools designed to support
the ACG, however, they still facilitate manual generation of
safety case. To address this, we have proposed an ACG tool
that considers the certification criteria along with system’s
design artifacts and evidences accumulated by human experts
to generate a fully decomposed GSN in an automated manner.
Specifically, the ACG tool along with the ALC Toolchain can
automatically generate design artifacts from the system model
architecture, and further populate an evidence store that is
required for the safety case generation process. In addition, it
can iteratively decompose the root node goal (or certification
criteria) of the GSN to automatically construct a GSN using
the Link-Seal-Expand steps. This automated GSN construction
significantly reduces time and human effort. Additionally, the
ACG tool has the capability to evaluate the generated safety
case using a confidence score. This evaluation mechanism is
novel and extends the existing popular tools like ASCE [10]
and AdvoCATE [13].
We also envision our tool to reduce the time and cost of
the certification process, and reduce the ambiguity in a safety
case that is otherwise introduced by too much involvement
of human experts. Further, we have also illustrated the pro-
posed ACG tool on an AEBS case study using a RC car
testbed. Currently the ACG tool is not fully functional for
online validation. We are working on integrating the different
components together, so that it can be validated with other CPS
testbeds. We eventually want to integrate the ACG tool into
the ALC toolchain to build a single comprehensive toolchain
for offline design, development and safety case generation of
CPS applications.
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